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Abstract: Classically, humans have been perceived as a source of faults in systems. 
Modern ergonomic views are promoting a somewhat different idea according to which 
humans are a factor of safety in unexpected situations. The safety of a system cannot be 
achieved without taking into account these two sides of cognition which compose what 
is called cognitive flexibility. In this paper, we will consider the cases of a nuclear 
accident and a plane crash-landing where human cognitive flexibility has impacted on the 
final safety of the system. We aim to discuss the violations that humans have performed 
in these cases with the assumption that they do not always deteriorate system safety. The 
discussion gravitates around a core argument according to which violations per se do not 
inform on the safety impairments in a system. Some other dimensions have to be taken 
into account. Among these, we are of the opinion that the accuracy of the operators’ 
mental model plays a key role, allowing some violations to improve system safety in 
emergency situations. 
Keywords: Large-scale systems safety, cognitive ergonomics,  violations. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Due to the increase of critical functions allocated to automatic agents (e.g. computers), 
the safety of socio-technical systems is an area where stakes are continuously being 
raised. But reducing these systems down to a set of pure technical components would 
discard a very hot topic: deterministic automatic agents cohabit with non-deterministic 
human agents. As the actions of the latter can impact very strongly on the final safety of 
any system where they are present, it is worth questioning ourselves about the integration 
of humans into socio-technical systems. However, this socio-technical label does not imply 
that sociology is the sole approach suitable for studying the role of humans in system 
safety. Even if a view at the system level cannot be avoided, cognitive psychology can be 
an interesting complementary approach for isolating individual factors. After Reason 
(1990; 1997), it is believed here that a combination of organisational arguments added to 
the identification of local individual factors offers an interesting analytical framework for 
discussing human actions. It may be even more suitable for the study of deviant actions 
since the latter can be generated by factors that lay outside of the boundaries of the 
physical workplace. As our objective for this paper is highlighting the impact of a class of 
deviant acts (i.e. violations), we will look at system safety by linking the local individual 
cognitive components of actions to the organisational context in which they are 
embedded. 
After Reason (1990), violations can be seen as deliberate actions that deviate from the 
practices that designers and regulators have defined as necessary1. The position defended 
in this paper promotes that violations performed by humans at work are too often seen 
as generators of accidents. Although this view has reigned in cognitive psychology 
throughout recent decades and has indeed allowed enrichment of the analysis of large-
2scale accidents, we would like to emphasise a somewhat different view according to 
which violations can have a positive impact on system safety (Reason, 1997). We will 
thus discuss violations in rather neutral terms, as an expression of human cognitive 
flexibility. In the following section (section  2), we will very quickly consider some 
fundamentals about cognitive psychology. In doing so, we will oppose a classical view 
(that has studied cognitive limitations) to a more recent one (that has highlighted the 
human contribution to systems’ regulation). After the presentation of these two views, 
we will come to the core of the paper and will consider violations (section  3). Precisely, 
we will expose two case studies that shed some light on two opposite facets of violations, 
namely their contribution to impairing or enhancing system safety. The case studies will 
call for a careful discussion (section  4) where we suggest that the violations and the 
mental model that operators run have to be considered together, along with the liberty 
that violations allow on the system’s configuration. This position will drive our set of 
recommendations (section  5). 
2 HUMAN AGENTS IN SYSTEMS 
2.1 The classical view: Humans’ cognitive limitations2 
The cognitive approach made a big step forward in psychology by quantifying the limits of 
human reasoning capacity. Experimentally speaking, the revolution came from a seminal 
work carried out by Miller (1956) in quantifying the limits of short-term memory. His 
magical number seven plus or minus two has strongly influenced the psychology of memory. 
Later, on the processing side, Wason (1966) showed that humans are submitted to biases 
when solving logical problems. This was the beginning of a change in the conception of 
human reasoning. Humans were no longer simulated as wet machines performing logical 
operations (see the General Problem Solver by Newell, Shaw & Simon, 1957) but considered 
as fallible information processors obeying biased heuristics. On the social side of 
psychology, such a demonstration had already been done as early as 1959 when Festinger 
and Carlsmith published their theory of cognitive dissonance. With this innovative work, 
they demonstrated that humans can distort their discourse or beliefs in order to make the 
latter coherent with previously performed unwanted actions. Some years later, 
Kahneman and Tversky (1973), still in a social psychology line, demonstrated that 
people’s judgement is influenced by subjective perceived likelihood rather than by 
objective base rates. Many other biases were discovered and studied extensively after that 
date. Still in 1973, Chase and Simon pioneered some experimental work in a green field 
area: chess playing. They shook the traditional wisdom according to which experts had 
the highest performance in a given area. Chase and Simon demonstrated that expert 
chess players performance at recalling random game configurations, due to their skills 
being supported by a highly task-specific memory, could drop to the level of novices. 
 
Studying and quantifying human limits in reasoning has provided an extremely valuable 
amount of knowledge on cognition. From this fundamental work, a whole trend of 
research emerged in the 1980s which focussed on cognitive factors at the workplace. But 
it quickly became obvious that there was a need for zooming out from purely individual 
issues in order to encompass the complexity of the context in which individuals act. A 
new approach named cognitive ergonomics then became targeted at understanding the 
cognitive acts at the workplace, eventually discovering and exploring humans’ potential 
contribution to system safety. This will be the topic of the next section. 
32.2 The cognitive ergonomics view: Humans as regulators of systems 
Following the nuclear accident in Chernobyl in 1986, Reason (1987) produced a paper 
assessing the contribution of the human agents to the disaster. Since then, many other 
papers have adopted this view about large-scale accidents according to which human 
errors must be analysed along with systems’ failures. At about the same period, 
Rasmussen (1986) published what was recognised as the bible in human-machine 
interaction. Due to his engineering background, his view on human agents was much 
more focussed on their role of regulators and controllers. Rasmussen proposed that the 
operators’ have various types of behaviours (skill-based, rule-based and knowledge-
based) relying on different kinds of knowledge. This framework later inspired Reason’s 
(1990) classification of errors, leading to a more unified vision of human agents in 
dynamic systems (see also Hollnagel, 1993 for a classification of human error models and 
concepts). 
In the cognitive ergonomics’ view, the information processing modes that humans 
implement at work are based on heuristic short-cuts built on top of the experience 
acquired through a life-long dynamic interaction with a diverse and changing 
environment. The resulting processing mode prioritises a trade-off between saving 
cognitive resources and perfect responses to the environment. This trade-off covers a 
very wide continuum that allows some room for errors and imperfections. However 
unsuitable to critical processes it may appear, this information processing strategy 
provides the flexibility that is required to perform and control uncertain actions in 
response to unknown problems. In the cognitive ergonomics conception, humans are no 
longer regarded as anonymous components in a system. They are conceived as agents 
dedicating their mental resources to adapting themselves to varying environments, 
dealing with unknown situations and, as a result, participating to system safety. Such 
researchers as Hollnagel, Amalberti, Cacciabue or Woods have contributed to the 
enrichment this conception. We will not get into deeper details here as the case studies 
exposed later will give the opportunity to discuss these views and authors.  
 
In this section, we have defended the idea that human cognitive capacities are extremely 
valuable regarding safety. However, there are factors that are inextricably linked to the 
validity of the goals pursued and actions taken. These are the knowledge and information 
that operators keep in memory when performing their task. The latter very strongly 
impacts on the quality of the dialogue between the operator and the environment. This 
issue will be addressed in the next section. 
2.3 Mental models in action 
When they interact with a system, humans need to understand what is going on and what 
has to be done. For this reason, they maintain a virtual mental representation of the 
various ongoing and expected processes in a system. This representation is called a mental 
model. But as we have seen in the previous section, humans’ memory and processing 
capacities have limits. So in response to these, mental models are incomplete 
representations of reality that are fed by a) a portion of the total amount of knowledge 
on the system and updated by b) only a selection of the data available in the 
environment. These selections are driven by the objectives that the operators have on the 
system (Rasmussen, 1986). For instance, aircraft maintenance crews operate on a 
different set of data than pilots, although both are actors in the same system. Thus 
mental models must be seen as very scarce, dynamic, goal-driven representations of 
reality (Ochanine, 1978) which incompletely reflect the system acted upon (Moray, 1987). 
When they are adapted to a given situation, mental models contain the knowledge that is 
necessary to conduct an interaction, and data extracted from the environment. Via a 
4proper updating process, valid mental models allow goals to be achieved in a pro-active 
mode of control. This is extremely important in dynamic systems because the future 
states of the system and the consequences of one’s actions are then anticipated, allowing 
operators to keep control of the system they interact with. Needless to say however, 
humans can perform errors in building or updating mental models, e.g. because of a) 
erroneous knowledge or b) flaws in data gathering. A main cause of erroneous 
knowledge at the workplace is the extreme complexity of modern automated systems 
which unavoidably causes operator’s knowledge to be incomplete. We will see in section 
 3.1 what the consequences can be. There is much more to say about data gathering and 
far too little room in this paper. Let us just mention lack of or high expertise, strong time 
pressure and perceived similarity with a known situation as factors that degrade the 
accuracy of data gathering. 
 
The previous three sub-sections have introduced some cognitive concepts. We have seen 
in section  2.1 that humans were classically regarded as bounded information processing 
agents. This facet, although it cannot be denied, does not sufficiently highlight the 
regulation role that humans have in systems, thanks to the flexibility of their reasoning 
processes. We have emphasised this position in section  2.2. Although it is not the only 
mechanism for it, the so-called flexible reasoning is supported by mental models that can 
be updated dynamically and reshaped depending on the goals maintained by the operator 
(see section  2.3). But so far, we have only reinforced the well-known idea that humans 
are a central component in system safety and that their activity is controlled by a scarce 
mental representation of reality. This is the standpoint from which we will investigate 
violations and claim that the operators’ mental models have to be considered when 
reasoning about the safety of one’s acts. Our purpose will be to defend that violations do 
not solely lead to undesired events. When they are coupled with a valid mental model, 
they can ensure or even increase the safety level of a system. The following sections of 
this paper will aim at exposing this dual view. 
3 VIOLATIONS 
Violations have been mentioned or studied in a wide variety of contexts including car 
driving (Blockey & Hartley, 1995; Parker et al., 1995; Aberg & Rimmo, 1998), plane 
piloting (Air France, 1997), large-scale accidents (Reason, 1990) computer programming 
(Soloway et al., 1988) and bureaucratic environments (Damania, 2001). They are actions 
that intentionally break procedures (Reason, 1987; Parker et al., 1995), e.g. aiming at 
easing the execution of a given task. They may reveal the existence of faulty 
organisational settings when they are the only way to get the work done (Air France, 
1997). In this latter case, these violations are the result of latent organisational factors 
leading to the rules or procedures being broken in order to accomplish a given task. 
These latent factors are usually implemented by actors who are remote (i.e. managers) 
from the resulting risks (Reason, 1995). 
As we stated previously, violations may not be directly associated with accidents. The 
latter take more than violations to happen: they have to be combined with errors. 
Typically, a violation creates some specific unprotected conditions where recovering 
from an error no longer is possible. Major accidents in large-scale systems exhibit this 
combination (see for instance Gitus, 1988, about the Chernobyl accident), which is 
rooted in a variety of cultural, managerial and organisational factors (Cacciabue, 2000). 
In the following sub-sections, we will defend the idea that violations, under some 
conditions, can enhance system safety. This position will be built upon two opposite case 
studies highlighting two opposite sides of the reality of violations. The first case will 
depict a nuclear accident in a nuclear fuel processing plant in 1999, in Tokaimura, Japan. 
5With this case, we will expose the harmful side of violations. We will oppose it to what 
we call desirable violations with the case of the crash-landing of a DC-10 in 1989, in Sioux 
City, Iowa, USA. 
3.1 Harmful violations: The Tokaimura nuclear fuel plant 
On December 30, 1999, in Tokaimura (Japan)3, a criticality accident4 occurred at the 
JCO nuclear fuel processing plant, causing the death of two workers. The immediate 
cause of the accident was the pouring of approximately 15kg of uranium into a 
precipitation tank, a procedure requiring mass and volume control.  
The workers’ task was to process seven batches of uranium in order to produce a 
uranium solution. The tank required to process this solution is called a buffer column. Its 
dimensions were 17.5 cm in diameter and 2.2 m high, owing to criticality safe geometry. 
The inside of this tank was known to be difficult to cleanse. In addition it was located 
only 10 cm above the floor, causing the uranium solution to be difficult to collect from 
the bottom of the column. Thus, workers illegally opted for using another tank called 
precipitation tank (see Figure 1). This tank was 50 cm in diameter, 70 cm in depth and 
situated 1 m above the floor. Moreover, it is equipped with a stir propeller making it 
easier to use for homogenising the uranium solution. 
 
Figure 1: The precipitation tank at the JCO plant 
 
The workers thought it was not unsafe to pour the seven batches in the precipitation 
tank. This false belief directly caused the accident but was rooted in a complex 
combination of deviant organisational practices. Among these featured the pressures 
from the managerial team to increase the production without enough regard to safety 
implications and crew training. This policy impacted on the safety culture developed by 
the workers, providing them with excessive liberty, even for critical procedures. The 
crews’ practices were embedded in a work context where routine deviations were 
constantly approved, leading to the implementation of what Westrum (2000) calls a 
pathological safety culture. Previous successful attempts at reducing the cycle time led 
6uncontrolled actions to become the norm at JCO (Blackman et al., 2000). These 
management issues are discussed extensively in Furuta et al. (2000). 
 
The criticality JCO accident was caused by a management-enabled violation being 
coupled with the operators’ erroneous knowledge about the uranium critical mass. This 
coupling of a violation with an error has been identified by Reason (1990) as a very 
powerful generator of accidents. Although the causes of this accident, as they are rooted 
at the managerial level, call for an analysis at the system level (Bieder, 2000), we suggest a 
complementary individual cognitive approach highlighting the role of violations. 
In case of inappropriate use, precipitation tanks have already proven to be potentially 
dangerous (Paxton, Baker & Reider, 1959). In using this tank for producing so much of 
the uranium solution, the crews have a) inaccurately assessed the situation, b) developed 
a flawed set of actions and c) ignored the consequences of such actions. These three 
components have been identified as important features in the control of dynamic 
systems (Sundstrom, 1993). In disregarding them, the crews have implemented what 
Marsden and Hollnagel (1996) have qualified as opportunistic control. But we must also 
acknowledge, after Wagenaar (1987), that accidents are not necessarily caused by humans 
gambling and losing. Accidents occur because people do not believe that the ongoing 
scenario is at all possible.  
We would now like to point out that humans often operate illegal configurations of their 
work environment or procedures. In the case of the JCO plant, the workers used an 
illegal tank because the one they were supposed to use (the buffer column) could not 
help them respond to the production pressure from the managers. This sort of deviation, 
orientated towards easing the work regardless of safety is very common and obeys an 
implicit rule of least effort to accomplish a given task. Having said that, the critical 
deviations that trigger accidents rarely happen instantly. They often depart incrementally 
from the prescribed practice. They initially take the form of a slight reconfiguration that 
eases the work and that is found acceptable by the operators. Modifications are then 
progressively added to the tools or practice, each increment being assessed as acceptable 
per se. After years of such deviations, the work settings can happen to be far beyond the 
prescribed practice. Large-scale accidents are made of a concatenation of small failures 
(Mancini, 1987). 
 
With this JCO case, we want to highlight the workarounds that operators often 
implement in order to perform daily actions in a less constrained manner (see Gasser, 
1986). This can be achieved in a wild manner and depending on the level of awareness, 
getting the work done sometimes overrides safety concerns. However, violations must 
not be considered as exceptional actions. They are extremely common practices aimed at 
saving time and/or effort in performing a given task. They can be seen as shortcuts that 
bypass some of the steps required in the procedures. They are also one of the features of 
the cognitive flexibility that allow humans to solve unexpected problems. When the 
consequences of one’s actions are anticipated, violations can help implementing ad hoc 
control modes allowing to cope efficiently with exceptional situations. This issue will be 
addressed in the next section. 
3.2 Desirable violations: The Sioux City emergency landing 
On July 19, 1989, United Airlines flight 232 bound for Denver crash-landed at Sioux City 
Airport, Iowa5. One hundred and twelve people were killed and 184 survived. The 
aircraft was forced to land after a metallurgical defect in the fan disc of the tail-mounted 
engine (#2) caused its catastrophic disintegration. The severity of this failure was such 
that the engine’s accessory drive system was destroyed, which resulted in a loss of 
7hydraulic control. In addition, 70 pieces of shrapnel damaged the lines of the #1 and #3 
engines (see Figure 2), resulting in a complete loss of hydraulic control. At the time of 
the accident, the loss of all three, independent hydraulic systems was considered a billion 
to one chance. 
 
Figure 2: The damaged tail of the DC-10 (adapted from NTSB, 1990) 
 
The damage to the hydraulic lines resulted in the crew having no control over ailerons, 
rudder, elevators, flaps, slats, spoilers, or steering and braking of the wheels. The only 
control which the crew had was over the throttle controls of the two, wing-mounted 
engines. By varying these throttle controls, they were able, to a certain extent, to control 
the aircraft. However, as revealed by the radar plot diagram (see Figure 3), the control 
over the vertical and horizontal axes were dramatically impaired. For instance, in order to 
correct a bank and stop the aircraft turning onto its back, they had to cut one throttle 
completely and increase the other. In addition to this problem, the crew also had to react 
to phugoids6. This was brought about as cutting the power to turn the aircraft caused the 
speed to drop. In turn, this caused the nose to drop and the aircraft to dive. The crew 
had to attempt to control this oscillation throughout the 41 minutes between the engine 
failure and the crash-landing. They needed to cut the throttles when the aircraft was 
climbing and approaching a stall (as increasing the throttles would cause the nose to raise 
further still). The crew also had to increase the throttles when the aircraft began to dive 
(to increase the speed and bring the nose up). As both the pilot and the co-pilot were 
struggling with the yoke, they could not control the throttles. It is usually possible to 
control all three throttles with one hand. However, as the #2 engine had been destroyed, 
8its throttle lever was locked and the remaining two levers, on either side of the jammed 
lever, had to be controlled with one hand each. Fortunately, another DC10 pilot was 
onboard as a passenger and was brought to the cockpit. This second pilot could then 
control the throttles allowing the pilot and co-pilot to control the yoke and the co-pilot 
to maintain communication with the ground. This is, understandably not common flying 
practice and several flying procedures were obviously violated on this flight. 
 
 
Figure 3: Radar plot diagram (NTSB, 1990). 
 
By performing these violations, the crew were able to reach the airport –where the rescue 
teams where on standby- and save so many lives. It is unfortunate that the DC10 was on 
a ‘down’ phase of the phugoid when it landed as this resulted in the impact force being 
much greater than could have been achieved. Nevertheless, this event exhibits the neutral 
nature of violations. These can be beneficial to system safety when they are coupled with 
a valid mental model. They allow operators to implement ad hoc control modes and to 
some extent, cope with unknown configurations. 
In section  2.3, we have seen that mental models are built upon the knowledge operators 
have of a system and refined through the selection of environmental data. In this crash-
landing case, the pilots used their knowledge of the aircraft’s hardware to make the data 
displayed by the instruments converge towards a sensible representation of the situation. 
Building and updating a mental model is a crucial step in this kind of diagnosis-like 
activity and it can be flawed even among expert operators. This has been experimentally 
demonstrated among mechanics and electronics operators (Besnard, 2000; Besnard & 
Cacitti, 2001) and has been the cause of other air crashes (NTSB, 1997; METT, 1993). So 
it is fair to say that the pilots of the DC-10 achieved a high level of performance. In 
comparison to the JCO operators, the pilots developed a more anticipative mode of 
control coupled with a more global and more functional view of the situation (Cellier, 
Eyrolle & Mariné, 1997). 
9Another contributing factor in the relative success of this crash-landing probably relies 
on the mental model sharing that the pilots established. This component of distributed 
decision taking (see Hollan, Hutchins & Kirsh, 2000) is a core activity in flight tasks 
(Doireau, Wioland & Amalberti, 1997). The transcripts of the dialogues inside the 
cockpit reveal at least two instances of such a distribution: 
 
At 1552:34, the controller asked how steep a right turn the flight could make. The captain responded 
that they were trying to make a 30° bank. A cockpit crewmember commented, “I can't handle that steep 
of bank ...can't handle that steep of bank." (NTSB, 1990, p 22). 
 
At 1559:58, the captain stated "close the throttles." At 1600:01, the check airman stated "nah I can't 
pull'em off or we'll lose it that's what's turnin' ya." (NTSB, 1990, p 23). 
 
These two transcripts show that the pilots have a shared understanding of the situation. 
Each operator interprets the statements of the captain with regards to the limits of the 
controls that this pilot is acting upon. The decisions are shared among the crew members 
and the mental model that is supporting the piloting activity is composed of the 
knowledge of several agents. Indeed, at this time, United Airlines were advocating a 
policy whereby flight crews were encouraged to share information and opinions and not 
merely obey the captain without question. Finally, contrary to the JCO operators, the 
pilots understand very accurately the consequences of their actions although they are 
under strong time pressure. In the last extract of the transcripts, 18 seconds before 
touchdown, the captain asks for the throttles to be closed. This is the normal practice for 
landing a plane and this statement was probably released as a side effect of a rule-based 
behaviour7. Interestingly enough, the operator controlling the throttles rejected the 
statement, arguing that the throttles were steering the aircraft. This is an example of a 
safe violation supported by a valid mental model. By implementing an action contrary to 
the usual procedure, one can nevertheless keep an already degraded system’s state in 
reasonably safe boundaries. 
 
The pilots’ accurate mental model has led them to define viable boundaries for possible 
actions and allowed them to restore some form of control on the trajectory under strong 
time pressure and high risks. Controlling the aircraft on the basis of such a model 
afforded the implementation of positive desirable violations. Deviant acts were situated 
against the procedures but nevertheless exhibited a high degree of relevance.  
4 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SAFETY OF SOCIO-TECHNICAL SYSTEMS 
As Van der Schaaf (1992, quoted by Rauterberg, 1995) puts it, when a system’s 
unexpected configurations restore or enhance the reliability level, then these positive 
deviations must be analysed to improve the functioning of the system. This is the spirit 
of this paper, supported by the example of the DC-10 crash-landing. And inevitably, in 
the context of this research, violations per se are not considered as harmful. Although 
exceptions to the following statement exist8, we think what is harmful is an action, legal 
or not, carried out without a full understanding of its consequences. So when discussing 
the impact of violations in systems, one has to take into account the mental model that 
operators run. The two case studies exposed in this paper are two opposite instances of 
this argument.  
We obviously accept the idea that many lives are not put in danger thanks to pilots and 
operators correctly applying well-designed procedures. But these procedures rely on 
probabilities and this introduces a bias: In high-pace, high-critical systems, marginal 
emergency conditions for which no procedures exist imply such a narrow span of legal 
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actions that violations are sometimes the only way to control the system. Following 
procedures under nominal or even expected emergency settings is a good interaction 
principle. However, if we think of low-probability, high-risk, unexpected situations, then 
the rules that stand for expected, standard situations may not always apply. 
One lesson that can be learnt from violations in systems is that one should not expect 
humans to always act as prescribed. Procedures themselves do not rule the human 
behaviour (Fujita, 2000) and there are many ways in which humans can configure a 
system and use it in unexpected and/or unprotected modes. The motivation for doing so 
may be based on a heuristic evaluation. If the intuitive cost/benefit trade-off in 
reconfiguring a system allows an operator to ease the accomplishment of a task, then it is 
likely that this reconfiguration will be performed, even if it implies implementing a 
violation. In this trade-off, factors such as safety culture and risk perception are key 
notions. And again, whether or not the operator has a relevant knowledge of the 
potential consequences of his/her actions is what determines the level of risk involved. 
4.1 Violations as reconfigurations 
In our view, violations are actions that can be interpreted as ad hoc reconfigurations. In 
non-emergency situations, we conceive them as deviant acts that informally express a 
need for different working practices or tools. But violations also occur in emergency 
situations where they help implementing recovery control modes on a system. So a 
strong warning has to be given to systems designers. If the human agents of a system are 
not able to perform violations, it may reveal that the protections against human 
undesired actions have risen up to the point where the human cognitive flexibility cannot 
be exploited any more. This is probably the kind of situation that inspired Bainbridge’s 
(1983) ironies of automation. She suggests that the more advanced a control system, the 
more critical the role of human agents. This is potentially caused by the impossibility, 
beyond some point, to design perfect automated systems. This impossibility implies 
keeping the human agents inside the control loop in order to cope with potential 
unexpected events (Amalberti, 1996). 
Although not all violations are desirable, preventing humans from performing any is not 
the issue. The point is letting them configure the system at the condition that they are 
trained and have enough understanding of the risks associated with their actions (Fujita, 
2000). This correlates with Reasons’ (2000) view about high-reliability organisations: 
Human compensations and adaptations to changing events is one of the most important 
safeguards. In this conception, violations can contribute to make a system safer. If 
operators have sufficient knowledge and available cognitive resources, they can 
implement an anticipative mode of control which is a pre-requisite for a safe interaction 
with dynamic real-time systems. In such conditions, human agents are able to operate 
safe ad hoc modes of control in the case of e.g. emergency situations that were not 
expected by designers (Cf. section  3.2). Then, the flexibility of the human operator can 
maintain or improve the safety of a given system by enlarging the span of the control 
that he or she has on it. 
As far as the actual design is concerned, Woods (1993, quoting his 1986 work) suggests a 
two-fold view. “The tool maker may exhibit intelligence in shaping the potential of the artefact relative 
to a field of practice. The practitioner may exhibit intelligence in tailoring his activity and the artefact to 
the contingencies of the field of activity given his goals”. This highlights the dual view that one has 
to have about human agents in systems. Some people design tools, others use and 
reshape them so that the latter fit their intentions better, so to speak. This reshaping 
activity by users has been identified by Wimmer, Rizzo & Sujan (1999) as a source of 
valuable data that design teams must try to capture.  
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4.2 Violations and safety culture 
We have seen in section  3.1 that when flawed mental models combine themselves with 
violations, they can lead to serious impairments in safety. We have qualified these 
violations as harmful. As Reason (1990; 2000) and many others have pointed out, the 
existence of such violations is often caused by management flaws that propagate through 
the various layers of an organisation. As a consequence, a front-line operator causing an 
accident must not be regarded as an individual cognitive error but as a wider system 
failure. Even if the latter is not the approach we have adopted in this paper, we have to 
mention that operators are too often blamed for having performed actions that a flawed 
cultural context or a bad management policy made inevitable. The picture may be even 
worse. According to Van der Schaaf (2000), rules in organisations are often developed 
simply to protect management from legal actions. Such alarming issues have already been 
raised by Rame (1995) who asserts that some incidents even lead to data obfuscation 
when human factors are involved. The legal side of enquiries and the individual blame 
policy that still prevail in the western European society can be put into question as well, 
especially when they clearly disregard non-individual factors leading to accidents (see for 
instance Svenson, Lekberg & Johansson, 1999). 
Including humans in a system implies the acceptance of having them interacting with it 
in a manner that diverges from the specifications. Although it induces a risk, it exploits 
their capacity to handle these unexpected events that require ad hoc reconfiguration. This 
is a function that is extremely difficult to implement in machines and is widely accepted 
as being a typical human skill. The intriguing fact is that we seem to be more prepared to 
accept these violations when they lead to a happy end rather than when they cause an 
accident. They must simply be seen as the two facets of the same coin. In the end, as 
Woods and Shattuck (2000) suggest, the design options range from a centralised control 
inhibiting actors’ adaptation to variability or local actors’ complete autonomy 
disconnecting the hierarchy from any decision taking. Obviously, the final safety of a 
system will rely on the right balance between these two extreme points. Some hints about 
what we think can improve this balance are given in the next section. 
5 RECOMMENDATIONS 
After Cacciabue and Kjaer-Hansen (1993), we think that a design team designing 
machines interacting with humans should bring together a variety of skills, including 
engineers, computer scientists and psychologists. As this research originates from an 
interdisciplinary research project on dependable computer-based-systems9, the authors 
are rather sensitive to this kind of argument and will make the following 
recommendations rely on this principle.  
Following one aspect of the JCO case, we would like to emphasise the fact that 
violations that cause accidents are sometimes design or procedures failures. So the errors 
that are coupled with these violations must not always be interpreted as incompetence 
(Rizzo, Ferrante & Bagnara, 1995). Instead, they sometimes highlight the need for 
improvements on a given system. Although training is an obvious response to incidents, 
we will clearly focus on design issues, promoting a view according to which tools should 
fully support human decision making and improve system’s safety (Cacciabue, 1991; 
Hollnagel, 1987). 
The JCO and DC-10 cases (see section  3.1 and  3.2 respectively) tell us that violations can 
be inevitable to operators due to e.g. faulty organisational settings or emergency. So as a 
design principle, we suggest that violations should be expected and supported in order 
not to leave operators in a risky non-assisted mode of control. The considerations below 
follow this assumption. 
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Interface designers should expect almost-impossible cases to happen. Even if some very 
rare events are not worth addressing by a specific design decision, interfaces should be at 
least highly configurable to each user’s requirements (Hussey, 1999) and working 
methods (Bainbridge, 1998). We suggest that this configurability should be in accordance 
with the criticality of a system. For a safety-degraded critical system, safety constraints 
could thus be relaxed in order to allow variations in expertise, preferred control modes, 
etc. to perform emergency violations with maximal degrees of liberty. Such a design 
policy would offer to let the human be in full control of the system for adjusting the 
configuration to exceptional circumstances. The drawback is that the mental model of 
the operator has to be accurate whereas we know that, due to cognitive limitations, it is 
highly fallible. Moreover, as this option underexploits the potential of computer-based 
assistance systems, a complementary approach follows. 
Hollnagel and Woods (1999) assert that the goal of designing a man-machine system 
should be that of making the interaction between the operator and the machine as 
smooth and efficient as the interaction between two persons. But it is an essential part of 
human communication that each participant is able to continuously modify his or her 
model of the other. So after Amalberti’s (1992) concerns, we think machines should 
account for human operators’ context dependency. There may be enough knowledge in 
ergonomics and enough computational resources available in modern control systems to 
allow the implementation of screening functions dedicated to analyse human actions (as 
already suggested by Rasmussen, 1991). Such screening functions could dynamically 
support the operators’ reasoning, provide synthetic shots on the system’s state, anticipate 
which action is now required, which information will be needed next, etc. So we think 
the next generation of aid tools should be able to provide a) assistance for unexpected 
emergency situations as well as b) anticipative protection measures for dangerous acts. 
Operators need more help on these exceptional situations for which they have not been 
trained rather than on nominal settings. Although this specific topic is out of the scope 
of the paper, one possibility could be to design systems that have a model of themselves, 
the latter being coupled with the aforementioned screening functions. The objective 
would be to let the system match the operator’s attempted actions with the available 
system’s functions. 
6 CONCLUSION 
In this paper, after recalling some views on the contribution of human agents to system 
safety, we have been concerned with violations and the way they impact on systems. The 
Tokaimura and Sioux City cases show that violations can generate very different 
situations depending whether they are coupled with a valid or invalid mental model. 
These two views are not mutually exclusive in system’s lives. They cohabit at all times. As 
such, their double status i.e. contributing to or impairing system safety must be 
acknowledged by systems designers. Going further, the facts that some violations are 
possible warrants the presence of enough degrees of liberty for humans to exploit their 
innate cognitive flexibility. 
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Footnotes 
 
1. Although the concept of violation could lead to a wide discussion, we will use this 
simple definition for the purpose of this paper. 
2. An immense amount of studies should be reported here. As the humble purpose of 
this section is only to give a flavour of a classical trend in psychology, exhaustiveness will 
clearly not be the objective. 
3. Unless otherwise stated, the material in this section is from Furuta et al. (2000). 
4. There is a limited amount of uranium that can be put together without initiating 
fission. When this amount is exceeded, a chain reaction occurs, generating potentially 
lethal radiations 
5. Unless otherwise stated, the material in this section is from NTSB (1990) and from 
Captain Haynes, pilot on the United Airlines flight 232 (Haynes, 1991). 
6. A phugoid is an oscillation in the vertical flightpath of an aircraft whereby it repeatedly 
climbs and dives in association with fluctuations of speed. 
7. Although it is out of scope for this paper, it is worth mentioning the relative weakness 
of rule-based behaviour in marginal situations. Rules can be applied even if the all the 
conditions required for them are not present (Besnard, 1999).  
8. This could be the case of a system that is considered to be lost and upon which one 
performs a command or action whose consequences are not known, assuming that the 
system’s state cannot be worse anyway. 
9. http://www.dirc.org.uk 
